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ARE DIALOGUES ANTIDOTES TO 
VIOLENCE? TWO RECENT EXAMPLES FROM 
HINDUISM STUDIES 
Abstract: One of the convictions in religious studies and 
elsewhere is about the role dialogues play: by fulfilling the 
need for understanding, dialogues reduce violence. In this 
paper, we analyze two examples from Hinduism studies to 
show that precisely the opposite is true: dialogue about 
Hinduism has become the harbinger of violence. This is not 
because ‘outsiders’ have studied Hinduism or because the 
Hindu participants are religious ‘fundamentalists’ but 
because of the logical requirements of such a dialogue. 
Generalizing the structure of this situation, we argue that, in 
certain dialogical situations, the requirements of reason 
conflict with the requirements of morality. 
 
 
Our answer to the title of the article, which 
also constitutes the central thesis we will argue 
for, is this: no, they are not; in certain kinds of 
encounters, dialogues breed violence. We take two recent instances from 
Hinduism studies merely as illustrations of the kind of encounters we want 
to talk about; our thesis will appeal to a neutral notion of dialogue and a 
generic conception of violence. Because we are primarily interested in 
exploring the extent to which the formal nature of a dialogue contributes to 
generating violence, we will not look at the other issues involved in a 
dialogical situation. While such a narrow focus forces us to neglect certain 
kinds of nuances, it is our hope that this discussion adds an important 
dimension to the debate about the relation between dialogue and the 
cessation of violence. 





The Contexts of the Article 
In the past three years or so, a heated dispute has erupted in the 
American society. The dispute flared up when two books, both authored by 
professors at the American universities, became issues of contention 
among some Hindu groups in the United States. The first book is by Paul 
Courtright on Ganesa, the elephant-headed Hindu god; the second is by 
Jeffrey Kripal on the Bengali Saint, Ramakrishna Paramahamsa. A few 
Hindu groups called for public apologies, withdrawal of their books and 
their dismissal.1 Some individuals even threatened the authors with 
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physical violence.2 These events have become catalysts for a wider critique 
of the western portrayal of the Indian culture. 
This social context raises explanatory questions about these 
reactions.3 The standard answer is about the propagandist role played by 
the right-wing Hindu organization, the Hindutva movement, in the United 
States and elsewhere. This answer points out to the fact that the responses 
of the Hindus in the United States were neither monolithic nor uniform 
and that not all of them were incensed by these scholars and their 
explanations. Consequently, they see the hand of the right wing Hindutva 
behind many such angry responses. While such allegations are mostly true, 
one major issue has gone largely unnoticed. It concerns the ability of the 
Hindutva to find echoes in the largely politically unaffiliated Hindus in the 
American society and elsewhere. Into what kind of experience is Hindutva 
tapping? In the course of this article, we will formulate one aspect of what 
is perhaps a multi-dimensional answer, as it relates to the nature of the 
dialogical encounter. 
There is something more. Assuming the need for people of different 
religious persuasions to live together peacefully, what should they do 
when they disagree and want to solve their disagreement? The famous 
philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, once formulated the aporia 
confronting the ‘humankind’ and his solution to it in the following terms: 
“If the method of rational critical discussion should establish itself, then 
this should make the use of violence obsolete: critical reason is the only 
alternative to violence so far discovered.”4 If people want to solve their 
disagreements, it seems as though there are only two choices: either 
people kill each other or they sit down, discuss with each other and let 
ideas die in their stead. “In the face of argument of such quality,” writes 
Gellner – himself a Popperian – “one can only feel embarrassment.”5 In the 
course of this article, we will also discover what the embarrassment is 
about. 
According to Popper’s meta-theory of science, his bold claim can be 
temporarily accepted only if it cannot be refuted. We will refute the claim 
by arguing that, in some kinds of encounters, the kind of discussion that 
Popper has in mind generates violence. If our arguments hold muster, they 
establish two things: one is that the alternative between ‘reason and 
violence’ will not work; the second is that it refutes the assumption that a 
dialogue, in all cases and in all circumstances, reduces the chance of 
violence between disagreeing human communities. This assumption is 
often implicit in the calls for a dialogue between different religions, 
different cultures and different nations today. 
This call about the need for “dialogue” appears to overlook the prima 
facie evidence from our domain, which suggests the contrary: an intense 
religious dialogue has often gone hand-in-hand with a great deal of violence. This 
evidence for violence and the simultaneous occurrence of dialogue is in the 
history of Ancient Christianity in its struggle with the Roman religio, the 
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religious wars, the periods of reformation and contra-reformation in 
Europe and so on. Is this a mere contingent correlation? Or is it because 
these dialogues were either inter- or intra-religious in nature? Or is it 
because a dialogue with religions is simply impossible? Consequently, do 
we need “more dialogue” with and between religions, or “less” of it or 
“none” of it or a “different kind” of dialogue altogether? 
The Structure of the Article 
Even though we believe that the substantial thesis of this article is not 
dependent on an idiosyncratic use of language, we will take care to define 
our notions in the first section. From there on, we will use the word 
‘argumentation’ instead of the word ‘dialogue’, and maintain this usage 
consistently throughout. In this task, we draw upon what we consider to be 
the best theory of argumentation today.6 This substitution of words is also 
intended to suggest a very minimal claim: argumentation is at least a 
subset of dialogue. 
In the second section, we look at two examples from Hinduism 
studies. Here, we focus upon some passages from the works of Courtright 
and Kripal to merely show that some of their arguments could provide a 
ground for a serious disagreement.7 At that point, we will notice two facts: 
one is that some Hindus threaten the two scholars with physical violence;8 
the second is the quasi-total absence of attempts by the incensed Hindu 
groups to engage critically with Courtright and Kripal.9
At first sight, these two facts appear to lend credence to the ‘reason or 
violence’ hypothesis. There are no attempts by these groups to argue with 
the two authors and there is the threat of physical violence. In the 
presence of disagreements and the felt need to solve them, the ‘reason or 
violence’ hypothesis suggests a cause-effect relationship between these 
two events. Furthermore, we need other explanatory accounts of their 
existence. For our purposes, it does not matter what form such 
explanations take; but it does matter that one introduces them ad hoc. 
Instead of going down this route, we formulate a simpler hypothesis that 
not only explains the relationship between the above two events but also 
accounts for their existence. Our hypothesis merely construes the books of 
Courtright and Kripal as argumentative moves. This is done in the third 
section. 
In the fourth section, we analyze the nature of violence in the 
argumentative situation. Here, we outline the structure of Hindu 
experience that the Hindutva movement is tapping into.  In this way, our 
hypothesis also goes some way (though not all the way) in explaining the 
success of Hindutva. 
In the fifth section, we demonstrate a skew in the argumentative 
situation and exhibit some of the logical compulsions responsible for that 
skew. This skew consists of putting an asymmetrical burden of proof on the 
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participants in an argumentative discourse. We argue that any workable 
theory of argumentation has to make both substantive and formal 
assumptions to get off the ground and that it is epistemically impossible to 
localize the cause(s) of the skew in all cases. In other words, it is not possible 
to defend the claim that, in the argumentation between the Hindus and the 
western scholars, one could trace the skew to ‘defective’ theories or to the 
‘unreasonableness’ of either of the two parties. 
In the sixth section, we take up an allegedly ‘methodological’ question 
about studying the ‘Other’ and show why it is not methodological at all. In 
the process, we notice the presence of several other asymmetries in what 
should ideally be a symmetric dialogical situation. Here, we tie up some 
loose ends and conclude on some general reflections that might help in 
understanding the spirit and intent of this article better. 
1. Terminological Clarifications 
The field of logic (both formal and informal) has generated the most 
interesting theories of argumentation in the course of the last three 
decades. The Erlangenschule10 has successfully conceptualized the truth-
functional propositional calculus as dialogical logic;11 the pragma-
dialectical approach of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst12 is the 
most comprehensive in the field of argumentation from which we borrow 
our definition. 
“An argumentation is a phenomenon of verbal communication which 
should be studied as a specific mode of discourse, characterized by the use 
of language for resolving a difference of opinion.”13 If ‘verbal’ is seen as a 
synonym of ‘oral’, then the definition is too narrow because it speaks only 
of oral communication. All argumentations need not be face-to-face; e-
mails, internet chats and discussions on electronic forums are equally 
‘face-to-face’ in today’s world. Therefore, we shall drop this restriction. 
Instead, we will adopt the above definition with the proviso that ‘verbal’ 
includes both ‘oral’ and ‘written’ modes of discourse. When is there an 
argumentation between two or more people? Whenever there is a conflict 
of avowed opinions. Of course, this situation alone does not suffice for an 
argumentation to take place: both parties should want to resolve the 
difference of opinion and do so through a process of critical discussion.  
Under these conditions, the parties engage in argumentative 
discourse and arrive at a consensus based on certain rules binding upon 
them. Such rules emphasize the necessity of drawing inferences and 
incorporate some minimal pragmatic considerations, and some minimal 
conditions for verbal communication. Consequently, any argumentation 
will have to accept some or another set of rules.14
An argumentation consists of verbal utterances or sentences from 
natural languages. The structure of an argumentative discourse, then, 
consists of the relationship between such utterances or sentences. 
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Henceforth, we use the word ‘belief’ to speak of the sentences or 
utterances involved in an argumentation without, however, making any 
assumptions about the status and nature of beliefs. Since either criticism or 
justification of beliefs is at issue in an argumentation, they must be related 
to each other either logically or semantically. That is, between such beliefs, 
some kind of a deductive relation must hold.15
This ‘deductive relation’ is neutral and could belong to any of the 
following: the classical predicate calculus, intuitionist logic, para-
consistent logics, non-monotonic logics, deviant logics, non-standard 
logics, dialectical logics, adaptive logics, etc. Each of these logics has its 
own meta-logical notions of deduction and validity, soundness and proof, 
and so on. An argumentation theory is neutral with respect to the choice of 
logics; it merely proposes that once a suitable logic is chosen, the 
participants follow its rules of inference. 
Unless qualified otherwise, we use the word ‘violence’ in a generic 
sense: “injury by or as if by distortion, infringement, or profanation.”16 The 
same dictionary defines ‘injury’ as “an act that damages or hurts”. Both 
words could refer to physical or psychic events; this is how we use the 
word ‘violence’. The context of the use of these words clarifies any 
additional meanings as and when they accrue. 
2.  India through the American Eyes 
During the past five years, two books, both authored by American 
professors, have generated strong feelings among the Hindu Diaspora 
living in the United States. One is by Paul Courtright, Professor of Indian 
religions at Emory University. It is about the elephant-headed Indian deity 
called Ganesa. He is the son of Siva, who is the lord of destruction among 
other things.  Following an Indian reprint of this book in 2001, a huge 
controversy erupted. An internet petition signed by hundreds of Indians 
circulated on the web before it was withdrawn: some of the signatories had 
called for the death of the author. The famous Indological publisher, 
Motilal Banarsidass, withdrew this book after its re-publication because of 
the furore the book and the cover photo caused. Many academics issued a 
call to withdraw their books from the publisher because they felt that 
academic freedom was threatened by mob violence. Concerned Hindu 
communities in North America formed groups, circulated petitions, met 
with the Emory university authorities demanding that Paul Courtright be 
dismissed from service, his book withdrawn from the shelves of the library 
and that his lessons are not allowed to go on. The story even made it to The 
Washington Post.17
The second book is by Jeffrey Kripal, currently professor at Rice 
University. The subject of his investigation is Sri Ramakrishna 
Paramahamsa, the teacher of the more famous Swami Vivekananda (who 
established The Ramakrishna Mission in India and abroad). The mentor of 
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Kripal is the well-known Indologist at the University of Chicago, Wendy 
Doniger. Having received an award from the American Academy of Religion 
for the best first book of the year, it has been dogged by controversy ever 
since its initial publication in 1995. 
In both cases, the authors in question and their supporters argue that 
they treat their subject matter with sympathy and respect. They also insist 
that the way to knowledge is fraught with disenchantments and that one 
should be prepared to embrace unpleasant truths, if one seeks knowledge. 
Consequently, it is only reasonable that they treat the protagonists with a 
degree of suspicion: either they do not respect academic freedom or they 
are Hindu fundamentalists or both. 
These claims do not convince the incensed Hindu groups and 
individuals; nor are all of them Hindu fundamentalists. In fact, in any 
discussion about these books, an undercurrent of rage, a sense of fury, and 
the feeling of being violated are present among them. Why? To answer this 
question, we first need to take notice of what Courtright and Kripal do. 
Courtright’s Ganesa 
Let us focus only upon those passages that have generated the greatest 
outrage in the Hindu Diaspora. Ganesa, he writes, “remains celibate so as 
not to compete erotically with his father, a notorious womanizer, either 
incestuously for his mother or for any other woman for that matter.”18 
Moreover: 
Although there seem to be no myths or folktales in 
which Ganesa explicitly performs oral sex, his 
insatiable appetite for sweets may be interpreted as 
an effort to satisfy a hunger that seems 
inappropriate in an otherwise ascetic disposition, a 
hunger having clear erotic overtones. Ganesa’s 
broken tusk, his guardian staff, and displaced head 
can be interpreted as symbols of castration…This 
combination of child-ascetic-eunuch in the 
symbolism of Ganesa – each an explicit denial of 
adult male sexuality – appears to embody a primal 
Indian male longing: to remain close to the mother 
and to do so in a way that will both protect her and 
yet be acceptable to the father. This means that the 
son must retain access to the mother but not 
attempt to possess her sexually.19
This is also taken to explain why Ganesa is an elephant-headed deity: 
An important element in the symbolism of the 
elephant head is displacement or, better disguise. 
The myth wants to make it appear that the elephant 
head was not a deliberate choice but merely the 
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nearest available head in an auspicious direction or 
the head of one of Siva’s opponents to whom he had 
already granted salvation. From a psychoanalytic 
perspective, there is meaning in the selection of the 
elephant head. Its trunk is the displaced phallus, a 
caricature of Siva’s linga. It poses no threat because 
it is too large, flaccid, and in the wrong place to be 
useful for sexual purposes…So Ganesa takes on the 
attributes of his father but in an inverted form, with 
an exaggerated limp phallus – ascetic and benign – 
whereas Siva is hard, erotic, and destructive.20
Ganesa, then, is an attempt of the Indian psyche to transform the 
incestuous hunger that a son feels for his mother. The cognitive status 
neither of psychoanalysis nor of this particular reading of Freud (or 
psychoanalysis) is at issue. Let us assume that one could use Freudian 
theories to understand cultures and that Courtright provides us with a 
justifiable interpretation of Freud and/or psychoanalysis. Such 
interpretations transform Ganesa and Siva into symbols. To whom are 
these figures symbols? Whose psyche expresses the elephant trunk 
psychoanalytically, or represents Siva symbolically? There are three logical 
possibilities here: either these express the psyche of those individual 
scholars who indulge in such interpretations or why some 
unknown author conceived of Siva and Ganesa this way. Alternatively, and 
this is the third possibility, they are claims about the psyche of the Indians 
who do puja to Ganesa and Siva in these forms. 
Courtright does not claim that he is expressing his psyche in writing 
the book he has written. Nor does he suggest that he is psychoanalyzing 
the unknown ‘authors’ of these stories. If we take these into account, we 
are left with the third possibility, namely, here, a particular interpretation of 
psychoanalysis functions as an explanation of the Indian psyche: Indians do 
puja to Siva’s linga because ‘…’; Indians cook sweets while doing puja to 
Ganesa because the desire for sweets is an expression of ‘…’; and so on. (The 
ellipsis can be filled in by a suitable interpretation of psychoanalysis.) In 
other words, a particular reading of Freudian psychoanalysis functions as 
an explanation of the psyche of a people. This move which makes an 
interpretation of a text or a theory into an explanation of a situation is 
logically necessary because psychoanalysis is an explanation of the 
psychology of individuals. One does not have the freedom to choose a 
psychoanalytical explanation of the psyche and deny that one is providing 
an explanation of a psyche. About which Indians is this claim made? All 
Hindus who were, are, and will be: that is, all those who did, do and will 
do puja to the linga and to Ganesa. Such an explanation of the Indian 
psyche, in that case, requires compelling evidence before it can be 
considered true. The author, of course, does not provide this because he 
thinks he is advancing a psychoanalytical ‘interpretation’ of Ganesa. 
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Kripal’s Ramakrishna 
Consider now Jeffrey Kripal’s attempts to understand a Bengali saint, 
Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, the teacher of the more famous Swami 
Vivekananda. 
…[T]he literature on sexual trauma suggests that 
individuals who have experienced abuse often 
become adept at altering their state of 
consciousness, “split” their identities to separate 
themselves from the traumatic event, lose control of 
their bodily, and especially gastrointestinal, 
functions, experience visions and states of 
possession, become hypersensitive to idiosyncratic 
stimuli (like latrines), symbolically react to 
traumatic events, live in a state of hyperarousal, 
regress to earlier stages of psychosocial 
development, develop various types of somatic 
symptoms (including eating disorders and chronic 
insomnia), become hypersexual in their language or 
behavior, develop hostile feelings towards mother 
figures, fear adult sexuality, and often attempt 
suicide. The list reads like a summary of Ramakrishna’s 
religious life. Certainly it is not a matter of the saint 
manifesting one or two such symptoms, as is often 
the case with traumatized children and adults. 
Perhaps we could overlook that. But Ramakrishna 
manifests virtually all of them and displays them with an 
intensity that even the experienced psychiatrist might 
find alarming.21
Ramakrishna’s religious life, then, can be described in terms of a 
cluster of pathological symptoms. Under the terms of this description, the 
saint is pathological – his pathology arising from the trauma of sexual 
abuse. While one might grant the claim that the saint was pathological, the 
issue is this: how does this pathology explain the religious life of 
Ramakrishna? Kripal answers that “the homoerotic energies themselves, 
freed from the usual socialized routes by the ‘shameful’ nature of their 
unacceptable objects, were able to transform themselves, almost 
alchemically, until their dark natures began to glitter with the gold of the 
mystical.”22 These energies were “able to transform themselves”. How? 
“Almost alchemically”. In other words, ‘somehow’. Not only do these 
energies ‘alchemically’ transform themselves but they also ‘somehow’ 
continue with this transformation until they reach a certain stage, where 
they begin to “glitter with the gold of the mystical”. ‘Somehow’? ‘Almost 
alchemically’? 
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One might want to say that we are not clear about the mechanisms. 
And that the ‘somehow’ and ‘almost alchemically’ merely function as 
placeholders for a currently non-existent but a possible future explanation. 
And that this is merely a hypothesis one is putting forward. However, such 
a defence renders the explanation both trivial and ad hoc. To appreciate the 
charge of triviality, consider the following: Ramakrishna’s neural structure 
‘somehow’ generated his religious life; Ramakrishna’s genes ‘somehow’ 
interacted with his environment to enable his religious life… and so on. Do 
such claims advance our knowledge of anything? They do not. They are 
trivially true: all things happen ‘somehow’. Only knowledge tells us which 
things do not happen ‘almost alchemically’, as it were. 
However, considered as explanations, they are ad hoc in the sense that 
one literally sucks explanations out of one’s thumb to explain 
Ramakrishna’s ‘symptoms’. Apart from Kripal’s story, here are a few more: 
Ramakrishna had a currently unidentified rare disease, which caused his 
religious trances; Ramakrishna had a currently unknown brain affliction (a 
tumour growth), which caused the symptoms he had; Ramakrishna 
exhibited a currently unidentified behavioural syndrome… With just a 
little patience and a bit more inventiveness, one could conjure up many 
more explanations, which satisfy the ‘facts’. Each is as bad as the other is. 
Unless one specifies the mechanisms involved in the ‘transformation’, the 
explanation is both trivial and ad hoc. 
In this sense, there are prima facie reasons for discussing with Kripal 
and Courtright. Yet, hardly any of the incensed Hindus have critically 
engaged with either. In fact, most of the Hindu practitioners have not read 
either Courtright or Kripal with the care their books deserve. Many have 
read only some passages from Courtright (those we have cited) and almost 
all of them have heard that “Kripal calls Ramakrishna a homosexual 
paedophile.” These have sufficed for their actions – including the 
suggestions of physical violence. 
Using the ‘reason or violence’ hypothesis, it is easy to postulate a 
‘causal’ connection between the following two facts: unwillingness (or 
incapability) to discuss, and expressions of hostility and aggression. It is 
the burden of this article to provide a rival hypothesis that links these two 
facts differently. Furthermore, the ‘reason or violence’ idea does not, on its 
own, explain the facts: it does not tell us why there is an ‘unwillingness’ to 
discuss or why the Hindus resort to violence instead of, say, simply keeping 
quiet. In this sense, these facts force us to seek other explanations for their 
existence. We will propose an alternative that captures in its explanatory 
net both the relationship between the two facts and their existence. We 
suggest it is preferable to accept a single hypothesis that explains all these 
than take recourse to multiple hypotheses that account for them severally. 
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3. Argumentation as the Framework 
There are two ways of looking at this situation. The first follows the 
above sketch: two respected scholars have used some or another version of 
Freudian psychoanalysis in order to understand Hinduism. Surely, it is in 
the very nature of an intellectual enterprise to try to understand 
phenomena by using whichever theories one thinks are adequate for the 
job. To deny intellectuals this freedom is to threaten the very process of 
knowledge acquisition. 
In that case, the response of the scholars, whether western or Indian, 
and the reactions of some of the Hindus follow a well-prepared course. The 
second group would challenge the status of psychoanalysis or its ability to 
understand Hinduism; the first would argue that scholars have used 
psychoanalysis in understanding other religions, including Christianity. 
Some challenge the mastery of these scholars in the relevant languages 
and/or of the primary sources; the others reply that these writings have 
passed academic muster on that score. And so on. In between, most 
scholars indulge in very loud table thumping (the echoes of these have still 
not died down on the RISA-List), equally vigorous political hand waving 
and massively signed petitions to protect the virtues of ‘academic freedom’ 
from ‘mob violence’. And when asked to explain the violent reactions of 
the Hindus, almost every scholar will appeal to the favourite bogey-man: 
the ‘Hindu fundamentalism’. So, one is supposed to believe that all the 
incensed Hindus are brainwashed by the Hindutva movement, too stupid to 
understand the virtues of academic freedom and, of course, delivered to 
the mercy of base emotions. 
Even if the Hindutva movement has played a role in mobilizing the 
rage of the Hindus, none of the scholars we have either personally met or 
read seems to realize that they have a huge explanatory problem on their 
hands. Why are the Hindus incensed? Even though each scholar has his or her 
own story to tell, all take to the moral high-ground: the blemish has to be 
sought on the side of the Hindus. 
There is, however, a second possible description of the situation. We 
hypothesize that Kripal and Courtright make an argumentative move by 
writing their books. They have not merely studied Hinduism the way a 
physicist studies the refraction of light through a prism but are also 
communicating the results of their research to an audience that also 
comprises of Hindus. They are explaining the nature and structure of 
Hindu practices, whether it is doing puja to Ganesa or listening to the 
teachings of Ramakrishna. By creating an argumentative situation, we do 
not suggest that either of the authors intended an argumentation. But we 
do claim that, by enabling a ‘small’ transformation, this hypothesis suffices 
to explain the violence in the situation without appealing to any other 
hypotheses. 
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This transformation requires making a deliberate abstraction from 
the concrete social and political processes in which both the parties are 
rooted. This is deliberate because only in this manner would one be able to 
show the structural results of an argumentation. In some senses, it is like 
creating the ‘laboratory conditions’ for an experiment. We look at the 
argumentation as though both parties are sitting in a virtual seminar-class 
together, doing nothing other than engaging in this process. We need to 
follow the steps in the argumentative discourse without any “disturbing 
conditions” and observe their impact. 
To facilitate this, consider the following fragment of a verbal 
exchange between a hypothetical ‘scholar’, and an equally hypothetical 
‘Hindu’. Both the dialogue and its individual participants are our 
constructions meant merely to illustrate the problem. Even though one 
could distil such imaginary argumentations from the books written on 
Hinduism, our aim is more modest: outline the possible flow of one kind of 
argumentative discourse. 
Scholar: What are you doing? 
Hindu: Doing ‘puja’ (translated as ‘worship’) to Ganesa (‘Namaskara’ to 
Ramakrishna). 
Scholar: Why are you doing it? 
Hindu: Ganesa is a ‘deva’ (translated as ‘god’) (Ramakrishna is an 
enlightened guru). 
 
Scholar: What explains his status? 
Hindu: Ganesa is the son of Shiva (Kali revealed herself to him). 
 
Scholar: Why does Ganesa have an elephant head? (How did 
Ramakrishna become enlightened?) 
Hindu: It is Shiva’s doing. [Here, the story of Ganesa is recounted.] 
Hindu: It is due to Ramakrishna’s ‘tapas’ (translated as ‘penance’). 
[Here, the story of Ramakrishna is recounted.] 
 
Scholar: Yes, I know the story too. But you misunderstood my 
question. 
Hindu: What is your question then? 
 
Scholar: Explain Ganesa’s head (Explain Ramakrishna’s 
enlightenment). 
Hindu: I told you that already (refers to the story). 
 
Scholar: Your story merely narrates and claims to tell us what 
occurred. My question is about the why. 
Hindu: I do not understand you. 
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Scholar: Why was it an elephant head and not a human one? (Why did 
Ramakrishna do ‘penance’?)  
Hindu: I do not know. 
 
Scholar: Here is the explanation why Ganesa has an elephant head and 
Ramakrishna did ‘tapas’. (Now the Freudian explanations are presented.) 
Hindu: Silence. 
4. The Structure of Violence 
The first striking thing about these purported explanations (of Kripal 
and Courtright) is that they trivialize the experiences of the Hindus. When 
they discover that their mothers, sisters, all women and all men, merely 
worship the penis or follow a paedophile, the import of this ‘discovery’ are the 
following: (a) hitherto, all one did was to ‘worship’ the penis or revere a 
paedophile as a ‘saint’; (b) one is a ‘fool’ to think that one was doing 
something else. Such a ‘discovery’ not only makes all earlier acts of 
‘worship’ look foolish, it also insists that one is doubly foolish by not 
knowing this. The same consideration holds good when one realizes that 
Ganesa’s love for sweets expresses his appetite for oral sex or that his 
trunk is a limp penis. How foolish it must be to cook all those many, many 
sweet dishes during the festival of ‘Ganesa Chaturthi’! 
By virtue of this, experiences are transformed. What does the 
transformation consist of? Such alleged explanations redescribe 
experiences by twisting or distorting them. The act of doing puja to the Siva 
linga raises the question: how did one reverently worship a penis? Before 
reading Kripal, people thought that Ramakrishna’s attitude to women (say) 
was an expression of the saint’s enlightenment. However, when they 
discover what such an attitude actually is, viz., a development of “hostile 
feelings towards mother figures, and a fear of adult sexuality” arising from 
the trauma of sexual abuse, one does not recognize that attitude anymore 
for what it once was. 
Of course, it is the case that scientific theories ‘correct’ experiences too: 
we see a stick appearing bent when immersed in water and see the 
movement of the sun across the horizon. Our scientific theories tell us that 
neither is true. In such cases, it is important to note that they preserve our 
experiences the way they are (as the ancient Greeks phrased it:  sozein ta 
phainomena). That is, such scientific theories do not deny our perception of 
either the bent stick or the movement of the sun; they explain the necessity 
of such appearances.23 Scientific theories do not distort much less deny 
experiences. 
However, these explanations do precisely that: deny experiences. The 
worship of the linga is in reality not a worship of Siva at all, but a 
‘subconscious acknowledgement’ of some ‘repressed’ desire. The ‘religious 
trances’ of Ramakrishna were, in reality, a way of coming to grips with his 
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attempt to deal with the sexual urges he felt for young boys. Or, this is how 
he ‘transformed’ the experience of a possible sexual abuse.  
What happens when the experiences are trivialized, distorted, and 
then denied? If the Hindu ‘accepts’ the story of penis, both erect and limp, 
can he feel the same sense of reverence (or whatever else is appropriate) 
that he had, remember it too, without feeling a perfect ass? Could one 
remember the earlier ‘enlightened smile’ of Ramakrishna, when one sees in 
the portraits of the saint merely the lecherous grin of a paedophile? One 
cannot. That is, these purported explanations also deny access to one’s own 
experiences. 
Who or what is denying such an access? True, it is a theory but it 
theorizes someone else’s experience of the world. Much before Freud, 
Courtright and Kripal wrote whatever they did about the religions of India, 
people from other religions (first from Islam and then from Christianity) 
had said the same thing: the Indians worship the cow, the monkey, the 
penis, the stone idol and the naked fakir. This is how these people 
experienced India and her culture. Their theologies had prepared them for 
such an experience much before they came to India and they ‘saw’ only 
what they expected to see. The interpretations of the Muslim kings, the 
descriptions of the Christian missionaries, the reports of the Christian 
explorers and merchants, the developments within Christian theology, etc. 
are the ‘facts’ that the psychoanalytical scholars of religion seek to 
understand. They ‘theorize’ the European experiences of India. 
Consequently, what is denying the access to one’s experience is the 
experience of another culture, or the theorizing of such an experience. 
One’s experiences are trivialized, denied, distorted and made inaccessible by 
someone else’s experience of the world.  
Even this does not complete the story. The Hindu is also normatively 
compelled to accept that the experience of another culture is also his own 
experience of the world, whether or not this happens to be the case. In 
order to go about with the western culture, other cultures are obliged to 
deny their own experiences. Not only does one culture foist its ways of 
going about the world on others. The others also have to accept it 
voluntarily and actively cooperate. Such cooperation is morally obligatory 
on them. They are compelled to become volunteers in the process of 
denying their experiences of the world to themselves.  
If none of the above is violence, what else is? 
The method of rational, critical discussion, contra Sir Popper, is not 
“the only alternative to violence so far discovered.” In fact, it engenders 
violence in some intercultural argumentative situations. Reasonableness, it 
appears, is not an antidote to violence; in certain kinds of encounters, it 
breeds violence. 
We would suggest that the Hindutva movement is tapping into this 
experience. The recruiting base of the Hindutva in the United States and 
elsewhere is broad: it consists of people who are hardly ‘right wing’ in their 
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political leanings. Nor are such people prone to fall prey to the propaganda 
of some fundamentalist religious movement. But the issue of 
‘representation of Hinduism’ is a lightning rod that draws well-educated 
Hindus into the folds of Hindutva because it is able to link itself to this sense 
of violation. If this is the case, the situation raises the even more troubling 
but fascinating issue of the growth of Hindutva in India itself. It would 
suggest that one of the sources for the growth of Hindutva has to be sought 
in the most unlikely of places: the Indian ‘secularism’. Indeed, it appears 
that the post-independent Nehruvian secularism has been one of the 
harbingers of Hindutva and religious violence in India.24 If this is true, more 
of ‘secularism’ in India is not the antidote to the Hindutva and religious 
violence; such thoughtless remedies merely strengthen the growth of both. 
One aspect of the situation involving violence is now obvious: the 
attempts like those of Courtright and Kripal inflict violence by denying the 
experience of people whose religions they talk about. Even though we have 
focused only on these two authors, this observation is true for many, many 
more works in the West that study Hinduism, and Hinduism is mainly 
studied in the West. This is also the reason why, increasingly in the Hindu 
Diaspora, the western intellectuals studying Hinduism are looked upon 
with suspicion. 
However, this situation also raises two questions. The first is about 
the individual motivations of writers like these: are we to say they are 
inauthentic and are out to inflict pain on their fellow human beings? Even 
if we accept the logical possibility that some among them do have such 
psychologies, it is ridiculous to use it as an explanation for this state of 
affairs. So, we need to dig deeper. The second question is about the validity 
of the increasingly vociferous stance that only ‘the insiders’ should study 
Hinduism precisely in order to prevent such violence. If a practicing 
‘Hindu’ studies Hinduism, would such problems never come to the fore?   
In the following section, we will show that the answer is fairly 
complex. We shall suggest that it is intrinsic to the nature of the 
argumentative situation to bring forth violence. Such is the nature of the 
discussion that it engenders violence because of the structure of the 
argumentation itself. We will show that in such discussions, (a) the dialogue 
gets skewed in favour of one of the participants and (b) this skew compels 
him to commit violence.  
5. The Skew in the Dialogues 
In this section, we want to build a generalized argument that goes 
beyond the case of Hinduism studies which we have examined so far. To do 
so, however, we make use of the same strategy: in order to facilitate the 
process of comprehension and also signal the generality of the argument, 
we will continue to call the two hypothetical, individual participants in the 
dialogue as the ‘scholar’ and the ‘Hindu’ respectively. This baptism is one 
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of convenience: we could identify them equally well with variables (as ‘A’ 
and ‘B’) or as the protagonist and the antagonist (using their technical 
meanings from argumentation theory). However, purely for the sake of 
readability, we have chosen recognizable names. 
We now want to argue that in all such encounters, any further 
argumentation becomes tilted or loaded in favour of the scholar because the 
structure of argumentation compels him to indulge in a series of inter-
related cognitive moves. They are: (1) the scholar attributes some implicit 
premises to the Hindu; (2) these premises appear to explain the Hindu 
practices; (3) these explanations presuppose the truth of a specific 
psychological theory; (4) this theory structures the nature of the 
phenomena requiring explanation; (5) the Hindu is logically compelled to 
defend the moves of the scholar. Even though each of these moves appears 
intuitively obvious, their combined effect skews the argumentation as a 
whole. And this skew stakes the deck against the Hindu. 
The Cognitive Moves 
To begin with, there is the first move of attribution of implicit premises 
to the Hindu. If the wish is to have any further argumentation, one can 
have it only by attributing some specific premises to the Hindus. In the case 
of Courtright, one can continue the argumentation about justifying puja 
either to the Siva linga or to the ‘displaced phallus’ of Ganesa only by 
making assumptions about the ‘subconscious’ of the Indian psyche. To 
deny these premises is to deny the justificatory/explanatory challenge that 
Courtright issues. To do so is to refuse further argumentation. In the case 
of Ramakrishna, to deny the occurrence of sexual trauma of the saint is to 
deny participation in the argumentation. That is why, in the sequence we 
sketched in an earlier section, we made the Hindu fall silent. To appreciate 
this point better, consider two further developments in the argumentation. 
The first one: 
Scholar: Here is the explanation why Ganesa has an elephant head and 
Ramakrishna did ‘tapas’ (Now the Freudian explanations are presented.) 
Hindu: I do not buy it. 
 
Scholar: Ok. Do you have any explanation at all for the story?  
Hindu: No. (After some silence.) 
 
Scholar: Your story does not explain Ganesa’s head and hence justify 
your ‘puja’. Neither does it explain the ‘penance’ of Ramakrishna. My 
theory explains both. Even if this explanation is incomplete or defective, 
you have no other explanation. So, if you want to be rational then you will 
either accept this explanation or come up with a better one. 
Hindu: Silence. 
Let us now look in the second possible direction: 
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Scholar: Here is the explanation why Ganesa has an elephant head and 
Ramakrishna did ‘tapas’ (Now the Freudian explanations are presented.) 
Hindu: I do not buy the Freudian explanations. 
 
Scholar: Fair enough. There are many who also have problems with 
Freud and psychoanalytical explanations. However, I consider them 
illuminating. Therefore, I will continue to use this framework to make 
sense of Ganesa and Ramakrishna. Either you agree with me or let us agree 
to disagree. If you disagree, remember that we can only have a meaningful 
discussion when you come up with a different, alternative explanation. 
 
How can the Hindu keep the argumentation alive now? See how 
Courtright formulates the two kinds of responses open to the Hindus: 
… how do we do our work when some of the 
Others say, “you got it right, that’s what I mean,” or, 
“I hadn’t thought of it that way before, but, yes, that 
makes sense,” whereas other Others say, “your 
interpretation is offensive to me, and to all Hindus. 
Your book should be banned?”25
The Hindu either agrees with Courtright that the latter’s explanation 
makes sense or wants the books banned. These are not just factual 
alternatives; these are the only possible responses that the Hindus have in 
such situations. 
Could there be an argumentation without the scholar attributing such 
premises? No. The disagreements arise due to the attribution of such 
premises. In its absence, there is nothing to disagree about and hence there 
is no argumentation. There is a logical compulsion to impute such 
premises because the scholar disagrees not with the Hindu doing ‘puja’ but 
with the beliefs that underlie this practice. 
The second move transforms the attributed premises into explanatory 
schemes. That is, these explain the practices (or behaviours) of the Hindu.  
(a) “Because religion and religious worship express repressed libido, 
the figurative representation of the deities provides clues about repressed 
urges.” 
(b) “In effect, Ramakrishna took the “anxious energies” of his early 
sexual crisis for which he almost killed himself, and “turned them around 
the corner,” where they revealed their essentially mystical natures…he 
took what were regressive symptoms and, through Kali and her Tantric 
world, converted them into genuine experiences of a sacred, mystical 
realm.”26
In the third move, because the scholar assumes the truth of the 
explanatory schemes, he is also obliged to accept the truth of one specific 
psychology. In the cases presented above, it is important to note that the 
real object of discussion is some or another human practice. However, the 
argumentation is not about these practices but about the Hindu 
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practitioner’s beliefs about these practices. This shift at the object level is 
defensible only if we assume that discussing human practices is identical to 
discussing the beliefs of the actors about such practices. Better put: if 
human practices express the beliefs of the actors about these practices, 
then a discussion of practices is the same as discussing the beliefs the 
actors hold about such practices. When formulated so explicitly, we 
recognize the above claim as a part of one specific psychological theory— 
commonly called the intentional psychology.27 The scholar assumes that such 
an intentional psychology is true and, therefore, valid for all human 
beings. In fact, in his hands, this intentional psychology is also a 
philosophical theory about human beings. 
To understand the fourth move, let us notice that these explanations 
provide a structure to phenomena: Ganesa is one of the many Indian gods; 
doing puja is to worship Ganesa; stories about Ganesa incorporate religious 
beliefs; the depiction of Siva and Ganesa are religious symbols; and so on. 
Thus, these explanations specify not only what requires explaining but also 
how such an explanation should look like. Such an explanation must 
assume as true that (a) Hinduism exists; (b) it is a religion; (c) gods are its 
objects of worship; (d) Siva is a god; (e) he is worshipped as a linga; (g) linga 
is a phallic object; (h) Ganesa is also a god; (i) Ganesa’s trunk is a limp 
phallus; and so on and so forth. Having assumed the truth of these 
assumptions, one has to explain these either individually or collectively. 
The fifth move involves a logical compulsion, an obligation on the 
Hindu to defend the moves of the scholar. The Hindu is compelled to defend 
the moves of the scholar because these moves are logical and not 
psychological in nature. Because the scholar claims to identify the implicit 
logical premises of the Hindu, the latter has no choice but to defend them. 
The scholar imputes these premises thus making them implicit; they are 
true only on condition that the implicit psychological theory is also that of 
the Hindu; these are issues that never become a part of the argumentation: 
they become its presuppositions. 
What kind of presuppositions are they? Some are explicit; some are 
identifiable implicit premises and some others function the way the ceteris 
paribus clause (the clause that says “everything else remaining the same”) 
functions in the formulation of a scientific law. No amount of digging will 
ever allow us to explicate the ceteris paribus clause: in fact, its presence 
signals that one cannot enumerate28 what “all the things” are that must 
“remain the same.” Differently put, the argumentation becomes skewed 
because the party which makes the maximum number of unproven 
assumptions does not have to demonstrate their truth. The Hindu cannot 
ask the proof of this truth because he is unaware of all the assumptions: 
most are hidden in the ceteris paribus clause. Therefore, even when guided 
by explicit and prima facie non-partisan rules,29 all one can say about the 
argumentation is that it gets skewed even when one does not want or 
intend a skew. 
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Because of the above considerations, one might want to argue that the 
problem is with the nature of the additional premises and thus their 
semantic content. That is to say, the temptation is great to attribute the 
skew either to the use of some theory (the Freudian psychoanalysis in our 
case) or to some alleged defect in the argumentation. Apart from forcing us 
to come up with ad hoc explanations to explain the skew, this impression is 
also misleading: we cannot make such a claim on reasonable grounds. 
Epistemically speaking, such a claim has no warrant and is unjustifiable. 
Given the formal nature of the rules of argumentation, nothing of 
substantial interest follows from them unless one adds empirical and 
theoretical statements with a rich semantic content. All real-world 
discussions are about such statements and if an argumentation has to help 
us anywhere then it is in the actual world that its efficacy is tested. 
Consequently, to blame the semantic content (the Freudian theory) for the 
skew is equivalent to saying that a reasonable discussion is not possible in 
the real and actual world about the substantial issues, where differences of 
opinion exist. Furthermore, it is not possible to localize the specific 
premise that brings about the skew because of the ceteris paribus clause. All 
we can say is that the dialogue becomes skewed. We cannot proceed any 
further. Therefore, we cannot show that the skew arises from the use of 
Freudian theory to explain the Hindu practices; that is, we cannot show 
that its semantic content generates the skew. Nor can we show that the 
rules of argumentation are not the source of the skew. This confirms the 
result that philosophers of science have called the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’.30
What would happen if the Hindu refuses to accept that he assumes 
the truth of any of the premises the antagonist attributes? He will have to 
do more than merely say that he does not entertain the premises imputed 
to him; he will have to provide an alternative assumption that justifies the 
standpoint he has advanced. For instance, if the Hindus are not willing to 
accept the assumptions imputed to them, they have to come up with 
alternate assumptions that justify their beliefs. Such an alternative 
explanation will have to be about what ‘religion’ is, what the relation is 
between beliefs and human practices, what it means to do puja to the 
Hindu deities, how this is a justifiable explanation and so on and so forth. 
In other words, they have to be intellectual experts, who have explanations 
about many, many facets of their culture. The Hindu must not only have 
explanations for cultural phenomena but he must also accept that such 
explanations constitute the implicit premises of his argumentation. 
It is here that we see the skew in the dialogue in its sharpest form: the 
onus of proof is distributed unevenly between the participants in the dialogue. The 
scholar makes a series of cognitive moves and his defence is that they are 
logically necessary, if one wants a rational, critical discussion. The Hindu, 
for his part, has to have explicit alternatives, if he disagrees with the implied 
(or implicit) moves.  
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Let us also see where this has brought us. Firstly, it is obvious that one 
cannot accuse scholars like Kripal and Courtright of bad faith; nor could 
one hold their ‘psychologies’ accountable for their portrayal of Hinduism. 
Their use of psychoanalysis cannot be localized in their desire to ‘demean’ 
Hinduism; nor can one ‘explain’ their writings as a part of some nefarious 
anti-Hindu plot and propaganda. Secondly, by the same token, if ‘insiders’ 
do research and teach Hinduism, our problems do not get solved. They too 
would face the same set of issues. Given this, it is obvious that the so-called 
‘insider/outsider’ problem is barren as far as this situation is concerned. 
Violence is involved in the argumentative situation not because Kripal 
and Courtright are ‘outsiders’. We have hopefully appreciated the logical 
compulsion in the argumentation that forces them into making some 
cognitive moves. These moves, in turn, inflict violence on the experiential 
world of the Hindus. The latter, for their part, react violently because they 
are violated. Of course, this situation does not justify violence but it 
teaches us not to go around apportioning moral blame on the participants 
with nonchalance. 
6. When ‘They’ Speak Back… 
In our analysis thus far, we have deliberately ignored the many 
discussions on this topic. Many before us have said much about effacing 
the ‘Other’, the scholarly responsibility of allowing the ‘Other’ to speak, the 
‘right’ to speak about a religion, the nature of scholarly representation, and 
so on. It is often suggested that these are ‘methodological’ questions or 
issues of ‘normative’ epistemology. We will now argue that they are 
neither. 
In a recent article, Russell T. McCutcheon notices three facts about the 
scholar of religion in the study of the ‘Other’, especially from within the 
‘liberal humanistic tradition’.31
1. The scholar indulges in a remarkable role switching: while he wants 
to give a voice to the ‘Other’ as a liberal humanist, he also speaks in place 
of the ‘Other’.32
2. In the case of someone like Courtright, he notices a change from the 
early Courtright who wanted to efface himself as a scholar to the new 
Courtright who chooses to affirm himself by effacing the ‘Other’.33  
3. The inability of the scholar to digest dissent when the ‘Other’ 
speaks back.34
While one can resonate to the issues that McCutcheon raises, one 
cannot accept either his diagnosis of the situation or the remedy he 
proposes. To our mind, his diagnosis makes the scholars inauthentic: they 
employ a different set of tools when they focus on the ‘Other’ for whom 
“they feel little affinity” as against, what he calls, the “no cost Others”. If 
‘feeling affinity’ is why someone chooses one set of intellectual tools and 
not another, then Kripal and Courtright are no scholars but charlatans 
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instead. If true, they do not desire to produce knowledge. However, such 
condemnations require more proof and evidence than produced by anyone 
so far. In the space available, we cannot take up a discussion of his remedy, 
but we will shed a different light on the three issues he raises. 
Reconsider what Courtright and Kripal claim they do: they indulge in 
‘interpretations’. Let us leave aside what they are ‘interpreting’ but merely 
focus upon how they can be challenged. The Hindu can challenge the 
explanatory adequacy of the psychoanalytical theories: does Courtright’s use 
of psychoanalysis explain why Indians do puja to Ganesa? Does Kripal 
explain Ramakrishna’s religious life or not? The Hindu cites a story about 
Ganesa’s elephant head; Courtright explains both the meaning of the story 
and the “meaning in the selection of the elephant head”. Clearly, Courtright 
wins because a puranic story is not an alternative to a Freudian explanation 
of the “meanings” of that story. Even though Courtright claims to assume 
an ‘interpretative’ stance, his use of theories puts an explanatory burden on 
the Hindu. To challenge either Courtright or Kripal is to challenge either 
their use or the theory of psychoanalysis. That is, one can only challenge 
the explanatory power of these theories and, as we have seen, the Hindu 
cannot do that unless armed with an alternate explanatory theory. The 
scholar, by contrast, can challenge the ‘interpretation’ of the Hindu by 
dismissing it as mere minority opinion or as the ravings of the Hindu 
Fundamentalist or by assuming an explanatory stance. 
That is to say, there is an asymmetric division of argumentative roles. 
The scholar can switch between interpretative and explanatory stances, 
whereas the Hindu can only assume an explanatory stance. This 
asymmetric relationship is cognitive in nature: even though Courtright or 
Kripal use explanatory theories, only their ‘interpretation’ is the subject 
matter of the argumentation. Moreover, their interpretations acquire the 
status of unchallengeable opinions. To challenge their interpretations, one 
has to challenge the status of psychoanalytical explanation; doing the 
latter, however, enables these scholars to defend it as their opinion: “I find 
that psychoanalysis illumines dreams, stories and cultures. You do not. So 
let us agree to disagree.” The reason for this is not difficult to seek: the 
explanatory theories they base their interpretative stance upon is a 
presupposition of the argumentation and not its subject matter. 
Finally, something even more remarkable happens. Because the 
Hindu can challenge the explanatory adequacy of the theory only if he has 
an alternative, he is excluded from the argumentation until that stage. The 
scholar ends up talking to a ‘surreal’ Hindu; the Hindu is banished from the 
argumentative discourse and plays merely a pre-argumentative role. The 
scholar becomes a ventriloquist. 
In other words, additional asymmetries in a ‘symmetric situation’ 
come into focus: the Hindu is saddled with an explicit explanatory burden 
and is forced to assume a pre-argumentative role, whereas the scholar has 
the ‘choice’ of (or the “freedom to choose” between) being interpretative 
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or explanatory. Concomitant to this asymmetric cognitive burden, there is 
a corresponding asymmetry in their argumentative roles. 
We can now see why the role switching comes about: the scholar has 
an ‘interpretation’ and an explanation. The alleged ‘inconsistency’ of 
Courtright has to do with the nature of the situation and is not due to his 
inauthenticity or ‘lack of affinity’. The scholars do not employ different set 
of tools depending on their affinities; the explanatory theories they use 
become the presuppositions of the argumentation. Our problem, in short, 
has to do with what happens to an argumentation in certain kinds of encounters. 
Having taken a neutral conception of argumentation, we have 
construed two writings on Hinduism as an argumentation about a religion. 
This has enabled us not only to exhibit the violence involved in the 
situation but also to identify its two different sources: one is the 
requirement of reason; the other is a reaction to the inflicted violence. 
Even a limited analyses of the situation (much more can be said than what 
we have in this article) raises important and disturbing questions: about 
the relation between reason and violence, the need for argumentation, the 
morality of reason as it is embodied in such a discourse, and so on. If we 
think deeper and dig further, we encounter different kinds of 
argumentation in the history of religion: those between religions, within a 
religion, between atheists and believers etc. What other lessons do they 
hold in store for us? Whatever they might be, we hope we have succeeded 
in the one aim we had in this article: as students of religion, we should not 
simply go around issuing clarion calls for “more dialogue” with and 
between religions which is what the commonsense, the media and the 
politicians also advocate, as though that suffices to reduce the violence we 
hear and read about everyday. Assuming that argumentation is a subset of 
dialogue, we suggest that, at the minimum, some of these “dialogues” 
exacerbate violence; they do not reduce it. We are not suggesting the absence of 
dialogue as “the” remedy for violence. In fact, we have no remedy of any 
kind. But we submit that we would do well to study the history of religion, 
our academic specialization, in a way that has been rarely attempted so far.  
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Theodor W. Adorno (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1976), 292.  
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Press, 1985), 43.  
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irrelevant to our enterprise. 
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Eemeren et al., “Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory,” 285, italics ours). The 
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16 Violence in the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-
w.com/dictionary/violence. 
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State & Religious Conflict:  Liberal Neutrality & the Indian Case of Pluralism,” The 
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subscribing to intentional psychology. Neither Freud nor the authors under 
consideration reject this psychology: in fact, Freud also wants to explain the 
formation of beliefs that guide an agent’s practice. In the case of our authors, this 
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